Abstract. Threshold cryptography aims at enhancing the availability and security of decryption and signature schemes by splitting private keys into several (say n) shares (typically, each of size comparable to the original secret key). In these schemes, a quorum of at least (t ≤ n) servers needs to act upon a message to produce the result (decrypted value or signature), while corrupting less than t servers maintains the scheme's security. For about two decades, extensive study was dedicated to this subject, which created a number of notable results. So far, most practical threshold signatures, where servers act non-interactively, were analyzed in the limited static corruption model (where the adversary chooses which servers will be corrupted at the system's initialization stage). Existing threshold encryption schemes that withstand the strongest combination of adaptive malicious corruptions (allowing the adversary to corrupt servers at any time based on its complete view), and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) all require interaction (in the non-idealized model) and attempts to remedy this problem resulted only in relaxed schemes. The same is true for threshold signatures secure under chosen-message attacks (CMA).To date (for about 10 years), it has been open whether there are non-interactive threshold schemes providing the highest security (namely, CCA-secure encryption and CMA-secure signature) with scalable shares (i.e., as short as the original key) and adaptive security. This paper answers this question affirmatively by presenting such efficient decryption and signature schemes within a unified algebraic framework.
Introduction
Threshold cryptography [21, 22, 11] avoids single points of failure by splitting cryptographic keys into n > 1 shares which are stored by servers in distinct locations. Cryptographic schemes are then designed in such a way that at least t out of n servers should contribute to private key operations in order for these to succeed. In (t, n)-threshold cryptosystems (resp. signature schemes), an adversary breaking into up to t − 1 servers should be unable to decrypt ciphertexts (resp. generate signatures) on its own.
Designing secure threshold public key schemes has proved to be a highly non-trivial task. For example, the random oracle model [6] was needed to analyze the first chosen-ciphertext secure (or CCA-secure for short) threshold encryption systems put forth by Shoup and Gennaro [40] . Canetti and Goldwasser [15] gave a standard model implementation based on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [16] . Their scheme, however, eliminates random oracles at the expense of using interaction between decryption servers to obtain robustness (i.e., ensure that no dishonest minority deviating from the protocol can prevent uncorrupted servers from successfully decrypting) and to make sure that invalid ciphertexts do not reveal useful information to the adversary 1 . Other chosen-ciphertext-secure threshold cryptosystems were suggested in [1, 36, 23, 8] .
Non-Interactive Schemes. Using the innovative Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) methodology [17] , Boneh, Boyen and Halevi [8] showed the first non-interactive robust CCA-secure threshold cryptosystem with a security proof in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle idealization): in their scheme, decryption servers can compute their partial decryption result (termed "decryption share") without having to talk to each other and, in groups with a bilinear map, decryption shares contain built-in proofs of their validity, which guarantees robustness. These properties were obtained by notably taking advantage of the fact that, using bilinear maps, valid ciphertexts are publicly recognizable in the Boneh-Boyen identity-based encryption system [7] . Similar applications of the CHK methodology were studied in [12, 32, 4] .
In the context of digital signatures, Shoup [41] described non-interactive threshold signatures based on RSA and providing robustness.
Adaptive Corruptions. Historically, threshold primitives (including [40, 15, 23, 27, 8] ) have been mostly studied in a static corruption model, where the adversary chooses which servers it wants to corrupt before the scheme is set up. Unfortunately, adaptive adversaries -who can choose whom to corrupt at any time and depending on the previously collected information -are known (see, e.g., [18] ) to be strictly stronger and substantially harder to deal with. As discussed in [15] , properly handling them sometimes requires to sacrifice useful properties. For example, the Canetti-Goldwasser system can be proved secure against adaptive corruptions when the threshold t is sufficiently small (typically, when t = O(n 1/2 )) but this comes at the expense of a lower resilience and schemes supporting a linear number of faulty servers seem preferable.
To address the above concerns, Canetti et al. [14] proposed a method to cope with adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures (i.e., players must be able to safely erase their local data when they no longer need them) and also achieve proactive security [37] . In the case of proactive RSA signatures, this approach requires all servers to refresh their shares (by jointly computing a sharing of zero) after each distributed private key operation (effectively making schemes n-out-of-n rather than t-out-of-n for any t ≤ n). This limitation was removed in [29] and [3] , where simpler adaptively secure proactive RSA signatures are described. In 1999, Frankel, MacKenzie and Yung [28, 29] showed different techniques to achieve adaptive security while still using erasures.
Later on, Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [31] eliminated the need for erasures and gave an adaptively secure variant of the Canetti-Goldwasser CCA-secure threshold cryptosystem [15] . Unfortunately, their scheme -which is also designed to remain secure in concurrent environments -requires a lot of interaction between decryption servers. Abe and Fehr [2] showed how to extend Jarecki and Lysyanskaya's threshold version of Cramer-Shoup in the universal composability framework but without completely eliminating interaction from the decryption algorithm.
Recently, Qin et al. [38] suggested a non-interactive threshold cryptosystem (more precisely, a threshold broadcast encryption scheme whose syntax is similar to [19, 20] ) with adaptive security. Its downside is its lack of scalability since private key shares consist of O(n) elements, where n is the number of servers (while, in prior schemes, the share size only depends on the security parameter).
Our contribution. We give the first robust threshold cryptosystem which is simultaneously chosen-ciphertext secure under adaptive corruptions and non-interactive while being scalable (i.e., providing short private keys). Unlike [38] , our scheme features constant-size private key shares (where "constant" means independent of t and n) for public keys of comparable size. In addition, it is conceptually simple and relies on assumptions of constant-size whereas [38] relies on a "q-type" assumption where the input is a sequence of the form (g, g α , . . . , g (α q ) ), for some secret α ∈ Z p . Unlike [14] , we do not have to perform proactive refreshes of private key shares after each decryption operation.
Our starting point is the identity-based encryption (IBE) system [9, 39] proposed by Lewko and Waters [34] and the elegant dual system approach introduced by Waters [43] . The latter has proved useful to demonstrate full security in identity and attribute-based encryption [43, 33, 34] but, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been applied to threshold cryptosystems so far. It is worth noting that the security proof of our scheme is not simply a direct consequence of applying the CHK paradigm to the Lewko-Waters results [34] as the treatment of adaptive corruptions does not follow from [17, 34] . Like [34] , our proof uses a sequence of games. While we also use so-called semi-functional decryption shares and ciphertexts as in the IBE setting [34] , we have to consider two distinct kinds of semi-functional ciphertexts and an additional step (which aims at making all private key shares semi-functional) is needed in the proof to end up in a game where proving the security is made simple.
We also describe a non-interactive threshold signature that follows the same line of development and which can be proven secure in the standard model under adaptive corruptions. This appears to be the first security result under adaptive corruptions for non-interactive threshold signatures in the standard model.
Technically speaking, the encryption scheme can be visualized as a variant of the Boneh-BoyenHalevi threshold system [8] in groups whose order is a product N = p 1 p 2 p 3 of three primes, which are chosen at key generation. Interestingly, if the factorization of N is somehow leaked, the proof of security under static corruptions implied by [8] still applies and only the proof of adaptive security ceases to go through. We also believe the semantically-secure variant of our scheme (which is obtained by removing the appropriate "checksum values" allowing to hedge against chosenciphertext attacks) to be of interest in its own right since it is multiplicatively homomorphic (like the ElGamal encryption scheme [24] ) and retains security under adaptive corruptions in the threshold setting. It can thus find applications in important protocols such as e-voting for example.
Organization. Section 2 recalls the definitions of threshold cryptosystems. The scheme and its CCA-security are analyzed in sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. A variant with shorter ciphertexts is described in section 4. Our threshold signature is presented in appendix B.
Background and Definitions

Definitions for Threshold Public Key Encryption
Definition 1. A non-interactive (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme is a set of algorithms with the following specifications.
Setup(λ, t, n): takes as input a security parameter λ and integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) (with 1 ≤ t ≤ n) denoting the number of decryption servers n and the decryption threshold t. It outputs a triple (P K, VK, SK), where P K is the public key, SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) is a vector of n private-key shares and VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ) is the corresponding vector of verification keys. Decryption server i is given the share (i, SK i ) that allows deriving decryption shares for any ciphertext. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the verification key V K i will be used to check the validity of decryption shares generated using SK i .
Encrypt(P K, M ): is a randomized algorithm that, given a public key P K and a plaintext M , outputs a ciphertext C.
Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C): takes as input a public key P K and a ciphertext C. It outputs 1 if C is deemed valid w.r.t. P K and 0 otherwise.
Share-Decrypt(P K, i, SK i , C): on input of a public key P K, a ciphertext C and a privatekey share (i, SK i ), this (possibly randomized) algorithm outputs a special symbol (i, ⊥) if Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C) = 0. Otherwise, it outputs a decryption share µ i = (i,μ i ).
Share-Verify(P K, V K i , C, µ i ): takes as input P K, the verification key V K i , a ciphertext C and a purported decryption share µ i = (i,μ i ). It outputs either 1 or 0. In the former case, µ i is said to be a valid decryption share. We adopt the convention that (i, ⊥) is an invalid decryption share.
Combine(P K, VK, C, {µ i } i∈S ): given P K, VK, C and a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size t = |S| with decryption shares {µ i } i∈S , this algorithm outputs either a plaintext M or ⊥ if the set contains invalid decryption shares.
Chosen-ciphertext security. We use a definition of chosen-ciphertext security which is identical to the one of [40, 8] with the difference that the adversary can adaptively choose which parties it wants to corrupt.
Definition 2.
A non-interactive (t, n)-Threshold Public Key Encryption scheme is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (or IND-CCA2 secure) and adaptive corruptions if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in this game:
1. The challenger runs Setup(λ, t, n) to obtain a public key P K, a vector of private key shares SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) and verification keys VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ). It gives P K and VK to the adversary A and keeps SK to itself.
2 The adversary A adaptively makes the following kinds of queries:
-Corruption query: A chooses i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains SK i . No more than t − 1 private key shares can be obtained by A in the whole game. -Decryption query: A chooses an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ciphertext C. The challenger replies with µ i = Share-Decrypt(P K, i, SK i , C).
3.
A chooses two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 . The challenger flips a fair coin β R ← {0, 1} and computes C = Encrypt(P K, M β ).
4.
A makes further queries as in step 2 but it is not allowed to make decryption queries on the challenge ciphertext C .
5.
A outputs a bit β and is deemed successful if β = β. As usual, A's advantage is measured as the distance
Consistency. A (t, n)-Threshold Encryption scheme provides decryption consistency if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in a three-stage game where stages 1 and 2 are identical to those of definition 2 with the difference that the adversary A is allowed to obtain all private key shares. In stage 3, A outputs a ciphertext C and two t-sets of decryption shares Φ = {µ 1 , . . . , µ t } and Φ = {µ 1 , . . . , µ t }. The adversary A is declared successful if 1. Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C) = 1. 2. Φ and Φ only consist of valid decryption shares. 3. Combine(P K, VK, C, Φ) = Combine(P K, VK, C, Φ ).
We note that condition 1 aims at preventing an adversary from trivially winning by outputting an invalid ciphertext, for which distinct sets of key shares may give different results. This definition of consistency is identical to the one of [40, 8] with the difference that A can adaptively corrupt decryption servers.
Hardness Assumptions in Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
We shall use groups (G, G T ) of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 endowed with an efficiently computable map (a.k.a. pairing) e : G × G → G T such that: (1) e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab for any (g, h) ∈ G × G and a, b ∈ Z; (2) if e(g, h) = 1 G T for each h ∈ G, then g = 1 G . An important property of composite order groups is that pairing two elements of order p i and p j , with i = j, always gives the identity element 1 G T . In the following, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote by G p i the subgroup of order p i . For all distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we call G p i p j the subgroup of order p i p j . In this setting, we rely on the following assumptions introduced in [34] .
These assumptions are non-interactive and, in all of them, the number of input elements is constant (i.e., independent of the number of adversarial queries).
A Robust Non-Interactive CCA2-Secure Threshold Cryptosystem with Adaptive Corruptions
Our starting point is applying the Canetti-Halevi-Katz [17] transform to a (conceptually equivalent) variant of the Lewko-Waters IBE [34] in the same way as [8] derives a CCA2-secure threshold cryptosystem from the Boneh-Boyen IBE [7] . We show that composite order groups and the techniques of [34] make it possible to handle adaptive corruptions in a relatively simple way and without having to refresh private key shares after each private key operation.
To this end, we apply a modification to the IBE scheme [34] [Section 3]. The latter encrypts M under the identity ID ∈ Z N as (M · e(g, g) α·s , g s , (u ID · v) s ) for a random exponent s ∈ Z N and where the public key is g, u, v, e(g, g) α , with g, u, v ∈ G p 1 . We implicitly use an IBE scheme where messages are encrypted as (M · e(g, h) α·s , g s , (u ID · v) s ), where h = g and e(g, h) α is part of the public key.
Another difference is that, in order to ensure the consistency of these scheme (as defined in section 2.1), the ciphertext validation algorithm has to reject all ciphertexts containing components in the subgroup G p 3 .
Description
In the description hereafter, the verification key of the one-time signature is interpreted as an element of Z N . In practice, longer keys can be hashed into Z N using a collision-resistant hash function.
Setup(λ, t, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) (with 1 ≤ t ≤ n), the algorithm does the following.
Choose bilinear groups (
and compute e(g, h) α . 3. Choose a strongly unforgeable one-time signature Σ = (G, S, V).
Define the public key to be
and set private key shares SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) as
The public key P K and the verification key VK are made publicly available while, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, SK i is given to decryption server i. Encrypt(P K, m): to encrypt m ∈ G T , generate a one-time signature key pair (SSK, SVK) ← G(λ).
Choose s R ← Z N and compute
where
In any other situation, return 0.
As far as efficiency goes, the ciphertext-validity check can be optimized by choosing
, which rejects ill-formed ciphertexts with overwhelming probability and saves two pairing evaluations. Similar batch verification techniques apply to simultaneously test t or more decryption shares using only two pairing evaluations 2 .
We note that, following Boyen, Mei and Waters [12] , it is possible to shorten ciphertexts by eliminating SVK and σ. In this case, C 2 is calculated using a hash value of (C 0 , C 1 ) in place of SVK. Given that C 2 is no longer authenticated by a one-time signature, the security proof then requires an additional step to make sure that adversaries cannot modify the G p 2 component of C 2 in the challenge ciphertext. The details are of this optimized variant are provided in section 4.
We also observe that, as in [8] , decryption shares can be seen as signature shares (for a message consisting of the verification key SVK) calculated by decryption servers. In appendix B, we show that the underlying threshold signature is secure against chosen-message attacks in the adaptive corruption scenario.
Security
The security proof departs from approaches that were previously used in threshold cryptography in that we do not construct an adversary against the centralized version of the scheme out of a CCA2 adversary against its threshold implementation. Instead, we directly prove the security of the latter using the dual encryption paradigm [43, 34] .
Our proof proceeds with a sequence of games and uses semi-functional ciphertexts as in [34] , and decryption shares. Still, there are two differences. First, two kinds of semi-functional ciphertexts (that differ in the presence of a component of order p 2 in the target group G T ) have to be involved. The second difference is that we need to introduce semi-functional private key shares at some step of the proof and argue that they cannot be distinguished from real key shares. The proof takes advantage of the fact that, at each step of the sequence, the simulator knows either the G p 1 components of private key shares {h
of those shares, for some Z 2,i ∈ R G p 2 , which suffices to consistently answer adaptive corruption queries. Theorem 1. The scheme is IND-CCA2 against adaptive corruptions assuming that Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 all hold and that Σ is a strongly unforgeable 3 one-time signature.
Proof. The proof proceeds using a sequence of games including steps similar to [34] and additional steps. As in [43, 34] , the proof makes use of semi-functional ciphertexts and decryption shares (which are actually private keys in [34] ). In addition, we also have to consider semi-functional private key shares. Another difference is that we need two kinds of semi-functional ciphertexts.
• Semi-functional ciphertexts of Type I are generated from a normal ciphertext (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) and some g 2 ∈ G p 2 , by choosing random τ, z c R ← Z N and setting
• Semi-functional ciphertexts of Type II are generated from a normal ciphertext (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) by choosing random τ, z c , θ R ← Z N and setting
2 Namely, t shares {µi = (Di,1, Di,2)} t i=1 can be batch-verified by drawing ω1, . . . , ωt
Strong unforgeability refers to the infeasibility, after having obtained a message-signature pair (M, σ), of computing a new pair (M , σ ) = (M, σ).
• Semi-functional decryption shares are obtained from a normal decryption share (
and setting
• Semi-functional private key shares
The proof considers a sequence of q + 6 games. It starts with the real game Game real followed by Game restricted , Game * restricted Game 0 , Game 1 , . . . , Game q and finally Game * q and Game f inal . Game restricted : is identical to Game real with the difference that the challenger B rejects all postchallenge decryption queries (SVK, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ) for which SVK = SVK , where SVK denotes the one-time verification key included in the challenge ciphertext. Game * restricted : is identical to Game restricted with the difference that the adversary A is not allowed to make decryption queries (SVK, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ) for which SVK = SVK mod p 2 . Game 0 : is identical to Game * restricted but the normal challenge ciphertext is replaced by a semifunctional ciphertext of Type I. Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ q): in this game, the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional ciphertext of Type I and the challenger B answers the first k decryption queries by returning semi-functional decryption shares. As for the last q − k decryption queries, they are answered using normal decryption shares. Game * q : is identical to Game q with the following two differences. -All private key shares are made semi-functional and thus contain a random G p 2 component. -The Type I semi-functional challenge ciphertext is traded for a semi-functional ciphertext of Type II. Game f inal : is as Game * q but the Type II semi-functional challenge ciphertext is replaced by a semifunctional encryption of a random plaintext (instead of M β ). In this game, A has no information on the challenger's bit β ∈ {0, 1} and cannot guess it with better probability than 1/2.
As in [34] , when a semi-functional decryption share is used (in combination with t − 1 normal decryption shares) to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, decryption only works when z k = z c , in which case the decryption share is called nominally semi-functional. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, the transitions between Game k−1 and Game k is done in such a way that the distinguisher cannot directly decide (i.e., without interacting with A) whether the k th decryption share is normal or semi-functional by generating this share for the challenge verification key SVK . Indeed, in such an attempt, the generated decryption share is necessarily either normal or nominally semi-functional, so that decryption succeeds either way.
Moreover, during the transition between Game q and Game * q , we have to make sure that the distinguisher cannot bypass its interaction with the adversary and try to distinguish the two games by itself either. Should it attempt to decrypt the challenge ciphertext using the private key shares, the transition is organized in such a way that decryption succeeds regardless of whether the private key shares (resp. the challenge ciphertext) are normal or semi-functional (resp. semi-functional of Type I or II).
The proof is completed by lemma 1 to 6, which show that all games are computationally indistinguishable as long as the one-time signature is strongly unforgeable and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Lemma 1. If the one-time signature Σ is strongly unforgeable, Game real and Game restricted are indistinguishable.
Proof. The proof uses the classical argument saying that the only way for the adversary to create a legal decryption query (SVK , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ) after the challenge phase is to break the strong unforgeability of Σ. Moreover, the challenge one-time verification key can be defined at the very beginning of the game. Hence, computing a valid pre-challenge decryption query involving SVK would require the adversary to compute a valid signature without having seen a single signature (or even the verification key) and a fortiori break the security of Σ.
Lemma 2. Provided Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 both hold, Game restricted and Game * restricted are indistinguishable.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one of lemma 5 in [34] . Namely, the only situation where the two games are distinguishable is when the adversary A manages to come up with a ciphertext for which SVK = SVK but SVK = SVK mod p 2 . In this case, the challenger B can compute gcd(SVK − SVK , N ), which is necessarily a non-trivial factor of N . Depending on which factor is found, B can break either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2.
The proofs of lemma 3 and 4 proceed exactly as in [34] and we give them in appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1, no PPT adversary can distinguish Game * restricted and Game 0 .
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2, no PPT adversary can distinguish Game
In comparison with the security proof of [34] , the novelty is the transition from Game q to Game * q , which is addressed in lemma 5. This transition allows turning all private key shares into semi-functional shares in one step.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 2, Game q and Game * q are indistinguishable.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, we assume that a PPT adversary A can tell apart Game q and Game * q . We construct an algorithm B that, given elements (g, 
To generate a decryption share on behalf of decryption server i for a ciphertext (SVK, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ), B chooses r, w, w R ← Z N and generates a semi-functional decryption share
Whenever A decides to corrupt decryption server i, B simply reveals SK i . We note that, in the situation where T ∈ G p 1 p 3 , B is clearly playing Game q . Now, let us consider what happens when T ∈ R G. In this case, T can be written as
3 for some random γ 1 ∈ Z p 1 , γ 2 ∈ Z p 2 , γ 3 ∈ Z p 3 and h is implicitly set as h = g γ 1 . From the simulator's standpoint, the G p 2 components of private key shares {SK i } n i=1 are not independent since a polynomial of degree t − 1 goes through them in the exponent: for each index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we indeed have
of the challenge ciphertext information-theoretically reveal e(g 2 , g 2 ) γ 2 ·τ ·P (0) . However, the public key does not reveal anything about α mod p 2 and the distribution of VK is uncorrelated to {P (i) mod p 2 } n i=1 . Moreover, as decryption shares are generated as per (3), they perfectly hide P (i) mod p 2 in the first term SK i of the product D i,1 . Hence, since the adversary A cannot obtain more than t − 1 private key shares throughout the game, the correlation between the G p 2 components of {SK i } n i=1 is information-theoretically hidden to A. Indeed, given that P [X] ∈ Z N [X] is chosen as a random polynomial of degree t − 1, its evaluations P (i) mod p 2 are t-wise independent. In other words, for any (t − 1)-subset C ⊂ {1, . . . , n} chosen by A, the values {g
} i∈C∪{0} are statistically indistinguishable from a set of t random elements of G p 2 . This means that, from A's view, (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) and {SK i } i∈C look like a Type II semi-functional ciphertext and a set of t − 1 semi-functional private key shares, respectively. We conclude that, if T ∈ R G, the simulator B is actually playing Game * q with A.
In the proof of lemma 5, we note that B cannot distinguish T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 from T ∈ R G by itself: if B tries to decrypt the challenge ciphertext (given by (2)) using the decryption shares {SK i } n i=1 , decryption recovers M β in either case.
Lemma 6. Under Assumption 3, no PPT adversary can distinguish Game * q from Game f inal (the proof is deferred to the appendix A.3).
Obviously, concealing the factorization of N = p 1 p 2 p 3 is crucial for the proof of adaptive security. Nevertheless, even if p 1 , p 2 and p 3 are somehow revealed, the scheme can still be proved secure under static corruptions (using the same proof as [8] ) under the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption [7] in G p 1 .
Unlike [40, 8] , where consistency holds statistically, we demonstrate consistency in the computational sense. Proof. We describe an algorithm B breaking Assumption 1 using an adversary A against the consistency of the scheme.
Algorithm B takes as input the description of (G, G T ) and elements (g, X 3 ) with the task of deciding if T ∈ R G p 1 or T ∈ R G p 1 p 2 . To this end, it begins by generating a public key exactly as in the proof of lemma 3. This implies that B knows a, b ∈ Z N such that u = g a , v = g b as well as the polynomial P [X] (and in particular α = P (0)), which allows answering all adversarial queries. At the end of the game, the adversary A is assumed to output a ciphertext C = (SVK, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ) such that Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C) = 1 as well as two t-sets of valid decryption shares Φ, Φ for which Combine(P K, VK, C, Φ) and Combine(P K, VK, C, Φ ) result in different plaintexts.
We remark that the ciphertext sanity check always rejects ciphertexts containing G p 3 components in C 1 and C 2 . Hence, it is easy to see that the above situation can only occur if non-trivial G p 2 components appear in C 1 and/or C 2 as well as in at least one of the shares of Φ and Φ . This means that η = C 2 /C a·SVK+b 1 is in G p 2 with overwhelming probability. Indeed, since the pub-
A Variant with Shorter Ciphertexts
It is tempting to use optimizations of the CHK paradigm to compress ciphertexts by eliminating the one-time signature and its verification key. To this end, it is possible to adapt the non-generic approach of Boyen, Mei and Waters [12] .
The construction is similar to the one of [12] [Section 3.1] in its thresholdized version. The intuition of that scheme is to use a hash value of ciphertext components (C 0 , C 1 ) = (M ·e(g, h) α·s , g s ) as an "identity" for the underlying IBE scheme during the computation of the third ciphertext component. The main difference is that the use of composite order groups allows dispensing with the long public key (inherited from Waters' IBE scheme [42] ) consisting of O(λ) group elements.
In the system hereafter, the ciphertext overhead reduces to two elements in the subgroup G p 1 of the composite order group. Ciphertexts have the form (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) = (M · e(g, h) α·s , g s , (u κ · v) s ), where κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ). However, we have to deal with an additional difficulty which is inherent to the use of groups of composite order. Since the one-time signature was eliminated, there is no way to "authenticate" C 2 and prevent the adversary from re-randomizing the challenge ciphertext by introducing a G p 2 component in C 2 by itself. This can be solved by: (1) exploiting the ciphertextvalidity check that rejects all ciphertexts where (C 1 , C 2 ) have a G p 3 component (in this case, this check also comes into play in the proof of CCA2 security and not only in the proof of consistency); (2) adding one step in the security proof and show that, in the challenge ciphertext, the adversary cannot re-randomize the G p 2 part of C 2 without breaking some intractability assumption.
Setup(λ, t, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n, do the following.
Choose bilinear groups (G, G T ) of composite order
Set the public key as
and set private key shares SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) as SK i = h P (i) ·Z 3,i , where Z 3,i R ← G p 3 , for i = 1 to n. Verification keys VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ) are then defined as V K i = e(g, h) P (i) for i = 1 to n.
The public key P K and the verification key VK are publicized. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the share SK i is given to decryption server i. Encrypt(P K, m): to encrypt m ∈ G T , choose s R ← Z N and compute
where κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ) ∈ Z N . Ciphertext-Verify P K, C : parse C as (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) and compute the hash value κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ).
Return 1 if the equalities e(g, C 2 ) = e(C 1 , u κ · v) and e(C j , X p 3 ) = 1 G T for j ∈ {1, 2} both hold. Otherwise, return 0. Share-Decrypt(i, SK i , C): Parse C as C 0 , C 1 , C 2 and SK i as an element of G.
Otherwise, return 0.
and output the plaintext m = C 0 · e(C 1 ,
The proof of the following theorem explains how the security proof of the scheme in section 3 can be modified to establish the security of the above system. Theorem 3. The scheme is IND-CCA2 secure against adaptive corruptions assuming that Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 all hold and that H is a collision-resistant hash function.
Proof. The proof follows the one of theorem 1 and we only outline the changes. Semi-functional ciphertexts, decryption shares and private key shares have exactly the same shape as in the scheme of section 3.
The proof considers a sequence of q + 8 games. Throughout this sequence, C = (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) will always denote the challenge ciphertext and κ will stand for the corresponding hash value κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ).
Game real : proceeds like the real game. At the end of the game, the adversary A outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and challenger outputs 1 if and only if β = β.
Game restricted : is as Game real with the difference that, in the challenge phase, the challenger halts and outputs 1 in the event that the adversary A previously made a decryption query (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) for which C 1 = C 1 . Game * restricted : is identical to Game restricted but the challenger B rejects all post-challenge decryption queries (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) for which (C 0 , C 1 ) = (C 0 , C 1 ) and κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ) = H(C 0 , C 1 ) = κ . Game * * restricted : is like Game * restricted but the adversary A is now disallowed to make post-challenge decryption queries (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) for which κ = κ mod p 2 (although κ = κ), where κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ) and κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ).
Game * * * restricted : is as Game * * restricted with one difference. Namely, the challenger B halts and outputs 1 if the adversary A manages to make a decryption query C = (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) such that Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C) = 1 and for which (C 0 , C 1 ) = (C 0 , C 1 ) and C 2 = C 2 .
Game 0 : is identical to Game * * * restricted but the normal challenge ciphertext is turned into a semifunctional ciphertext of Type I.
Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ q): in this game, the challenge ciphertext is a Type I semi-functional ciphertext and the challenger B answers the first k decryption queries by outputting semi-functional decryption shares. The last q − k decryption queries are normal.
Game * q : is like Game q with two differences.
-All private key shares are made semi-functional and henceforth contain a random G p 2 component. -The challenge ciphertext becomes a Type II (instead of Type I) semi-functional ciphertext. Game f inal : is as Game * q but the Type II semi-functional challenge ciphertext is now replaced by a semi-functional encryption of a random plaintext (rather than M β ). In this game, A the challenger's bit β ∈ {0, 1} is perfectly independent of A's view and A can only guess it with probability 1/2.
It is easy to see that Game real and Game restricted are negligibly far apart since, until the challenge phase, C 1 = g s is independent of A's view. In Game restricted , the probability that the challenger halts in the challenge phase is at most q/p 1 , which is negligible.
In Game * restricted , the challenger has negligible chance of rejecting a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game restricted as long as H is collision-resistant. As for the transition between Game * restricted and Game * * restricted , the indistinguishability of the two games is proved (under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2) exactly in the same way as in the proof of lemma 2.
The main difference with the proof of theorem 1 is the additional step proving the indistinguishability Game * * restricted and Game * * * restricted in lemma 7 and all subsequent transitions then proceed as in the proof of theorem 1.
Lemma 7.
As long as Assumption 1 holds, no PPT adversary can distinguish Game * * restricted from Game * * * restricted .
Proof. We show that, if the adversary has significantly different behaviors in Game * * restricted and Game * * * restricted , there exists a PPT distinguisher B that breaks Assumption 1. This algorithm B takes as input (g, X 3 , T ) and decides if T ∈ R G p 1 or T ∈ R G p 1 p 2 using its interaction with the adversary.
Algorithm B generates the public key P K by choosing h R ← G p 1 and setting e(g, h) α , X p 3 = X 3 , u = g a , v = g b . It randomly chooses a polynomial P [X] of degree t − 1 such that P (0) = α and defines SK i = h P (i) · Z 3,i , with Z 3,i R ← G p 3 , for i = 1 to n. Decryption queries and private key share queries are processed by following exactly the specification of the scheme.
When A enters the challenge phase, it outputs M 0 , M 1 ∈ G T and B flips a coin β R ← {0, 1} before returning a normal encryption of M β . We denote by
the resulting challenge ciphertext, where κ = H(C 0 , C 1 ). By hypothesis, A is able to notice the difference between the two games with non-negligible probability. However, the only situation where Game * * * restricted departs from Game * * restricted is when A queries the decryption oracle with a valid ciphertext (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) such that (C 0 , C 1 ) = (C 0 , C 1 ) and C 2 ), this necessarily means that C 2 and C 2 have the same G p 1 component and only differ in that C 2 has a non-trivial component in G p 2 (recall that the ciphertext validation algorithm rules out the presence of a G p 3 component in C 2 ). Hence, our distinguisher B can compute η = C 2 /C 2 ∈ G p 2 , which allows deciding whether T ∈ G p 1 or T ∈ G p 1 p 2 (since we only have e(T, η) = 1 G T in the latter case).
At the end of the game, A outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs 1 if β = β. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
A Proof of Lemmas 3, 4 and 6
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
As in [34] , we show that, if the adversary has non-negligible chance of distinguishing Game * Restricted and Game 0 , there is an algorithm B that, given (g,
The distinguisher B generates the public key P K by choosing h R ← G p 1 and setting e(g, h) α ,
It also chooses a random polynomial P [X] of degree t − 1 such that P (0) = α and sets
It answers all decryption queries and all private key share queries according to the specification of the scheme since it knows all private key shares {SK i } n i=1 . At the challenge phase, A outputs messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G T . The distinguisher B then picks β R ← {0, 1} and computes
where (SSK , SVK ) ← G(λ), and sets the challenge ciphertext as a tuple (SVK , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ),
has the distribution of a semi-functional ciphertext of Type I (i.e., where
, for some random s ∈ Z p 1 , τ ∈ Z * p 2 ) for which z c = a · SVK + b mod p 2 (note that this value looks random to A since A has no information on a mod p 2 and b mod p 2 until the challenge phase). We conclude that B is playing Game * Restricted in the former case and Game 0 in the latter case.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Let A be a PPT adversary that is able to distinguish Game k−1 and Game k for some k ∈ {1 . . . , q}. It implies an algorithm B which, given (g,
It also picks a random polynomial P [X] of degree t − 1 such that P (0) = α and defines
It answers all private key share queries according to the specification of the scheme since it knows {SK i } n i=1 . In the challenge phase, A outputs a pair of messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G T . The distinguisher B then flips a coin β R ← {0, 1} and computes
where (SSK , SVK ) ← G(λ). The above forms a Type I semi-functional encryption of M β for which z c = a · SVK + b. The way to answer decryption queries i, (
2 , σ (j) ) depends on the index j ∈ {1, . . . , q} of the query.
-If j < k, B chooses r, w j , w j R ← Z N and generates a semi-functional decryption share
-If j > k, B generates a normal decryption shares using the private key share SK i as specified by the decryption algorithm. -If j = k, B sets the decryption share as
If T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 , the k th decryption share has the distribution of a normal decryption share. If T ∈ R G, it is distributed as a semi-functional decryption share (i.e., where
We observe that, as long as we have
A.3 Proof of Lemma 6
We show that, if the adversary A can distinguish the two games, there is a PPT distinguisher B against Assumption 3. This distinguisher B takes as input (g, Z 2 , Z 3 , g α X 2 , g s Y 2 , T ) and has to decide if T = e(g, g) αs or T ∈ R G T .
To generate P K, algorithm B sets h = g γ 1 for a randomly chosen γ 1 R ← Z N . It then computes e(g, h) α = e(g α X 2 , h) and also sets X p 3 = Z 3 , u = g a and v = g b with a, b 
To generate a decryption share for a ciphertext C = (SVK, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ), B picks r, w, w
which forms a valid semi-functional decryption share. 
a·SVK +b before returning the ciphertext (SVK , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ). Whenever A decides to corrupt a decryption server i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, B simply reveals SK i . If T = e(g, g) αs , we observe that C = (SVK , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , σ) forms a semi-functional encryption of Type II of M β . If T ∈ R G T , C is distributed as a Type II semi-functional encryption of a random plaintext. In this case, the challenge ciphertext carries no information on β ∈ {0, 1}, which cannot be guessed by A with better probability than 1/2.
B Non-Interactive Threshold Signatures with Adaptive Corruptions
B.1 Definitions for Threshold Signatures
A threshold signature scheme is a tuple of algorithms Σ = (Setup, Share-Sign, Share-Verify, Verify, Combine) such that:
Setup(λ, t, N ): takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and a pair of integers t, N ∈ poly(λ) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ N . It outputs a public key P K and vector of private key share SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) and a corresponding vectors of verification keys VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ).
Share-Sign(SK i , M ): is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes in a message M and a private key share SK i . It outputs a signature share σ i .
Share-Verify(P K, VK, (i, σ i ), M ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message M , the public key P K, the verification key VK and a pair (i, σ) consisting of an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and signature share σ i . It outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether σ i is deemed as a valid signature share or not.
: takes as input a public key P K, a message M and a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size t = |S| with pairs {(i, σ i )} i∈S such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and σ i is a signature share. This algorithm outputs either a full signature σ or ⊥ if the set contains illformed signature shares.
Verify(P K, σ, M ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message M , the public key P K and a signature σ. It outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether σ is deemed valid share or not.
In the adaptive corruption setting, the security of non-interactive threshold signatures can be defined as follows, by extending the definition given by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [25] .
Definition 3. A threshold signature scheme Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if no PPT adversary A has non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The game begins with the challenger running Setup(λ, t, N ) to obtain P K, SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) and VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ). The public key P K is given to the adversary A. 2. A adaptively interleaves two kinds of queries.
-Corruption query: at any time, A can choose to corrupt a server. To this end, A chooses i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the challenge returns SK i . -Signing query: A can also ask for a signature share on an arbitrary message M and the challenger responds by computing σ i ← Share-Sign(SK i , M ) and returning σ to A.
3.
A outputs a message M and a signature σ . It wins if: (i) M was never submitted to the signing oracle; (ii) A did not obtain more than t − 1 private key shares in the game; (iii) Verify(P K, M , σ ) = 1.
A's advantage is defined as its success probability, taken over all coin tosses.
B.2 Construction
An adaptively secure threshold signature scheme in the standard model was notably described by Lysyanskaya and Peikert [35] . Unfortunately, servers have to run an interactive protocol to sign messages in their construction. This section shows that, in its threshold version (and modulo a slight modification in the public key), the signature scheme that underlies the Lewko-Waters IBE scheme [34] can be proved secure under adaptive corruptions. The signing algorithm as basically identical to the algorithm that produces decryption shares in the cryptosystem of section 3.
The description below assumes that messages are elements of Z N . In practice, longer messages can be signed by applying a collision-resistant hash function.
Setup(λ, t, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) with 1 ≤ t ≤ n, conduct the following steps.
Choose bilinear groups (
Define the public key as
and the private key shares SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) as SK i = h P (i) ·Z 3,i , where Z 3,i R ← G p 3 , for i = 1 to n. Verification keys VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ) are then defined as V K i = e(g, h) P (i) for i = 1 to n. P K and VK are made publicly available. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the decryption server i is supplied with the private key share SK i .
Share-Sign
and compute the signature share
for each i ∈ S, parse the signature share σ i as (σ i,1 , σ i,2 ) and return ⊥ if Share-Verify P K, VK, M, (i, σ i ) = 0. Otherwise, compute the combined signature
.
Verify P K, VK, M, σ : parse σ as (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ G 2 . Return 1 if and only if
The security proof applies the dual system methodology in the context of signatures as was suggested in [43] [Section 6] in prime order groups. The proof of the following theorem applies the same ideas in composite order groups and proceeds as in [5] .
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, the scheme is secure against chosen-message attacks and adaptive corruptions.
Proof. The proof considers a sequence of q + 2 games starting with the real attack game Game real and ending with Game q where proving the security is much easier. In the following we will denote by (i, M j ) the input of the j th signing query, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
The sequence of games involves the following types of signatures
Type B-1 signatures: are signatures of the form
where r ∈ Z p 1 , τ, z c ∈ Z p 2 . Type B-2 signatures: have the form (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = h α · (u M · v) r · g zs Game restricted : is identical to Game real with the difference that the adversary A cannot output a forgery on a message M such that M = M j mod p 2 (although M = M j mod N ), for some j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ q): is defined as a hybrid game where the challenger B answers the first k signing queries by returning Type B signatures whereas the adversary obtains Type A signatures at its last q − k signing queries.
The indistinguishability between Game restricted and Game real is proved using the usual argument in lemma 8. Then, lemmas 9 and 10 show that A has negligible chance of outputting Type B-1 or Type B-2 signatures unless either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2 fails to hold. Next, lemma 11 shows that, under Assumption 2, giving out semi-functional private key shares (instead of normal shares) does not increase A's probability to produce a Type B-1 or Type B-2 forgery. Finally, it is easy to prove that, when all signature shares and private key shares are semi-functional, any PPT forger necessarily contradicts Assumption 3.
Lemma 8. Any PPT adversary distinguishing Game real from Game restricted contradicts either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of lemma 1 (which is itself based on lemma 5 in [34] ).
Lemma 9. In Game restricted , the adversary A has negligible chance of outputting a Type B-1 or a Type B-2 signature if Assumption 1 holds.
Proof. We construct a distinguisher B that, on input of a tuple (g,
To this end, algorithm B interacts with the adversary A and generates the public key by drawing a, b, α
In addition, B picks a random polynomial P [X] such that P (0) = α. Private key shares are then defined as
Since B knows all SK i , it can perfectly answer signing queries and server corruption queries. By hypothesis, A eventually outputs a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), which is either of the Type B-1 form
) which is an element of the subgroup G p 2 p 3 . Unless σ is a Type B-1 signature for which z s = a · M + b (which occurs with negligible probability since a, b mod p 2 are independent of A's view), η has a non-trivial component of order p 2 . This implies that B can break Assumption 1 since it knows that e(T, η)
Lemma 10. The adversary outputs a Type A forgery with negligibly different probabilities in Game k and Game k+1 if Assumption 2 holds.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that a forger A has significantly higher probability of outputting a Type A signature in Game k+1 than in Game k . We outline a distinguisher B for Assumption 2. Algorithm B takes as input (g, X 1 X 2 , Z 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T ) and uses A to decide if T ∈ G or T ∈ G p 1 p 3 . Recall that A must obtain Type B-1 signatures at its first k signing queries and Type A signatures at the last q − k − 1 queries. The k th -query will be a Type A signature if T ∈ G p 1 p 3 and a Type B-1 signature if T ∈ G.
It comes that A will produce a Type A forgery with about the same probability in either case if Assumption 2 holds. We then show that the distinguisher B can indeed distinguish whether A's forgery will be of Type A or not with overwhelming probability. To this end, B prepares P K by choosing h
The public key P K = g, e(g, h) α , u, v, Z 3 is given to A. Then, B can perfectly answer private key share queries (since it knows {SK i } n i=1 ) and answers A's signing queries (i j , M j ) depending on their index j ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
Case j < k: to generate a signature share on message M j on behalf of server i j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, B first chooses r
It computes a Type B-1 signature share (σ i j ,1 , σ i j ,2 ) as
Case j > k: in this case, B simply computes a Type A signature using the private key share SK i j as specified by the signing algorithm. Case j = k: to answer the k th signing query
It uses the challenge T ∈ G to compute
It is easy to see that, in the situation where T ∈ R G, if we let g τ 2 be the G p 2 component of T for some τ ∈ Z * p 2 , we obtain a Type B-1 signature where
In contrast, if T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 , the above forms a Type A signature.
At the end of the game, A outputs a message M with a forgery σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) that satisfies the verification equation. At this stage, B returns 0 (meaning that it believes that T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 ) if σ is a Type A signature. If σ is a Type B-1 or Type B-2 signature, B returns 1 and bets that T ∈ R G.
To decide whether σ is a Type A signature or not, B uses its input element X 1 X 2 and defines Θ = (X 1 X 2 ) a·M +b . It interprets σ as a Type A signature if
It is easy to see that equation (5) can never be satisfied by a Type B-2 forgery and a Type B-1
Before the forgery stage however, the only information that A can potentially infer about a, b mod p 2 is the value z s = a · M k + b mod p 2 of the k th signing query. Since z s and z f are linearly independent as long as M = M k mod p 2 , a Type B-1 signature can only satisfy the test with probability 1/p 2 since a, b mod p 2 are uniformly distributed in Z p 2 .
Lemma 11. If the adversary can output a Type B-1 or Type B-2 forgery with substantially higher probability in Game * q than in Game q , there is a distinguisher for Assumption 2.
Proof. We now assume that a forger A has higher chance of outputting a Type B-1 or Type B-2 forgery in Game * q . We show that A implies a distinguisher B for Assumption 2. Algorithm B takes as input (g, X 1 X 2 , Z 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T ) and decides if T ∈ G or T ∈ G p 1 p 3 .
The distinguisher B generates P K by choosing α, a, b R ← Z N and setting u = g a , v = g b . It then sets e(g, h) α = e(g, T ) α , which implicitly sets h as the G p 1 component of T . The public key P K = g, e(g, T ) α , u, v, Z 3 is given to A. Also, B picks a random degree-t polynomial P [X] such that P (0) = α. Private key shares are set as SK i = T P (i) · Z 3,i , with Z 3,i R ← G p 3 , and the corresponding verification key VK is defined by V K i = e(g, SK i ) for i = 1 to n.
Then, B answers private key share queries by simply revealing the requested SK i to A. To generate a signature share on message M j on behalf of server i j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, B picks r R ← Z N , w 1 , w 2 R ← Z N , R 3 , R 3 R ← G p 3 and computes a Type B-1 signature share (σ i j ,1 , σ i j ,2 ) as
At the end of the game, A outputs a message M with a forgery σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) that satisfies the verification equation. It means that σ is necessarily of the form (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (h α · (u M · v) r · g τ 1 2 · R 3 , g r · g τ 2 2 · R 3 ), for some r ∈ Z p 1 , τ 1 , τ 2 ∈ Z p 2 and R 3 , R 3 ∈ G p 3 . At this stage B computes η = σ 1 /σ 2 a·M +b which is of the form η = h α · gτ 2 ·R 3 for someτ ∈ Z p 2 ,R 3 ∈ G p 3 and where h is the G p 1 component of T . Then, B checks whether the relation e(X 1 X 2 , η) = e(X 1 X 2 , T )
is satisfied. If yes, B outputs 0 (which indicates that T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 ). If (6) is not satisfied, B outputs 1 (meaning that T ∈ R G).
We argue that B has non-negligible advantage as a distinguisher. To see this, we first note that, if T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 , B is actually playing Game q with A and relation (6) holds wheneverτ = 0. If T ∈ R G (say T = h · g γ 2 2 · g γ 3 3 for some γ 2 ∈ Z p 2 and γ 3 ∈ Z p 3 ), it is rather playing Game * q since A gathers at most t − 1 private key shares SK i = h P (i) · g γ 2 ·P (i) 2 · W 3,i , with W 3,i ∈ R G p 3 , and their G p 2 components look independent from A's view.
Then, we observe that, if σ is a Type B-1 or Type B-2 signature, the expression of η is such thatτ = 0 with all but negligible probability (since a, b mod p 2 are completely independent of A's view). Whenτ = 0, relation (6) can only be satisfied with negligible probability. Indeed, in the situation T ∈ R G, the right-hand-side member of (6) can be written e(X 1 X 2 , T ) α = e(X 1 , h) α · e(X 2 , g 2 )
and given that e(X 1 X 2 , η) = e(X 1 , h) α · e(X 2 , g 2 )τ , we remark that the equality (6) can only hold if τ = γ 2 · P (0) mod p 2 . This only occurs with negligible probability since A obtains no information about α mod p 2 = P (0) mod p 2 during the game. We note that, whenτ = 0, the test (6) also fails in the case T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 , which causes the distinguisher B to incorrectly answer. However, this is not a concern as lemmas 9 and 10 already guarantee that A must break some assumption to produce a Type B-1 or Type B-2 signature when T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 (recall that B plays Game q if T ∈ R G p 1 p 2 ). Moreover, the hypothesis of the lemma implies that σ is more likely to giveτ = 0 if T ∈ R G than if T ∈ R G p 1 p 3 . By construction, the probability that B outputs 1 is thus higher in the former case.
Lemma 12. As long as Assumption 3 holds, no PPT adversary can output a Type A forgery in Game * q .
Proof. We outline an algorithm B that takes as input g, g α X 2 , X 3 , g s Y 2 , Z 2 and uses a Type A forger A to compute T = e(g, g) αs (and a fortiori break Assumption 3). To this end, B generates the public key P K = g, e(g, h) α , u, v, X p 3 by choosing a, b, γ 1 R ← Z N and setting h = g γ 1 , X p 3 = X 3 , e(g, h) α = e(g α X 2 , h) as well as u = g a and v = g b . In addition, B picks a random (t − 1)-degree polynomial Q[X] ∈ Z N [X] such that Q(0) = 1 and defines private key shares are defined as
is defined as in previous lemmas.
Whenever the forger A decides to corrupt a server, B simply reveals the corresponding private key share. When A makes a signing query (i, M j ), B chooses r 
